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Introduction 
After a long period of neglect (briefly punctuated in the aftermath of 1976), recent and 
contemporary township politics is now the subject of a burgeoning literature. [l] Among the 
considerable published and unpublished works are a number of processual accounts of 
township politics. [2] These have located township protests and conflicts in terms of more 
continuous processes of mobilization and radicalization. 
The comparison of these processual studies emphasises both the general and the specific 
features in each case-study, raising new issues and posing new questions. Variation between 
townships emphasises the importance of "historical alternativity" [3], in the sense of the 
possibility of processes in any township unfolding differently (as they did in other townships, 
perhaps). Common themes stand out more boldly than they do in individual accounts. 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, many of these themes are the orthodox concerns of social scientists. 
This paper considers one of these: the nature of apparent quiescence and rebellion on the 
part of the powerless. [4] 
Processual studies have widely recognized that, in order to understand the nature of protest or 
rebellion, it is first necessary to explore the origins of processes of mobilization and 
radicalization in the period before the protests occurred. Furthermore, these accounts have 
indicated the pervasive extent of apparent quiencence in townships. [5] This study tries to 
show that the nature of protest and rebellion in South African townships is illuminated by a 
thematic exploration of the phenomenon of apparent quiescence. 
The paper begins with a brief overview of the ways in which quiescence has generally been 
studied in the South African context. It outlines a theory of quiescence developed by John 
Gaventa, and applies it to townships. Gaventa argues that people's choice of action or 
inaction is shaped by the power relations they are involved in. Powerlessness to transform 
those relations and a vulnerability to further immiserization can combine to make inaction, or 
even reactionary behaviour, a rational choice. I argue that "quiescence" in African (officially 
"Black") townships did not involve general reaction, or inaction only, but widely involved 
multiple forms of non-confrontational struggle. c'Rebellion" was often the unintended 
outcome of what was intended to be one or other of these forms of non-confrontational 
struggle. 
Protest, Rebellion and "Quiescence" in Township Studies 
1976-77, 1980, and 1984-87 stand out in recent township history as periods of rebellion. 
But, almost two decades ago, Meer warned against characterizing a period (even the 1950s) 
solely on the basis of rebellion: 
[The] picture of a mass ready for the final plunge to liberate 
itself is deceptive. It is observed by abstracting the motifs of 
rebellion scattered through a. tapestry, which otherwise speaks 
of remarkable peace and quiet. [6] 
Her warning has rarely been heeded in studies of the period c1973-85, which have prioritized 
the "explanation" of major and confrontational protests or rebellions. Research into apparent 
non-protest has generally been neglected. Yet, even in this period, confrontational protests 
have been sporadic rather than generalized. 
Before 1976 and during 1977-84, there were very few confrontational protests in the 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) townships. In the latter period there was a resurgence 
of nationalist, civic and trade-union organization, and of recurrent guerrilla insurgency. The 
region was, none the less, largely unaffected by school boycotts in 1980, and there were few 
mass public protests over rent or bus-fare increases. Even during 1976-77 and 1984-85 there 
were no sustained confrontations in several townships. In many PWV townships during 
1976-77 there were few mass protests (with the important exception of school boycotts). 
Most of the incidents recorded by the Cillie Commission were arson attempts, involving very 
few people, often undertaken at night, and often unsuccessful. [7] During the first half of 
1984, there were mass public protests in relatively few townships. Several major townships - 
Soweto, Kagiso, Mamelodi - remained broadly quiescent during the whole of 1984, and even 
through much of 1985. It was only in 1985-86 that conflict became general and sustained. 
The persistence of apparent quiescence (and its neglect in research) has sometimes been 
noted. Adam and Moodley wrote (in 1986) that "the historical overall picture is one of 
compliance with unjust laws, obedience to a customary hierarchy, and acquiescence with, 
though not consent to, grossly unequal life chances", and quoted this Washington Post 
editorial from late 1984: 
The startling fact about South Africa is not that an occasional 
riot or police action brings White repression and Black unrest 
into the news but that there is, relatively speaking, so little 
evident protest. [8] 
Such studies have, however, been ahistorical, without empirical content or reference to other 
empirical research, and their "explanations" of apparent quiescence are so all-encompassing 
that they lapse into indeterminacy. They are, essentially, accounts of why townships might 
have been quiescent, and not why they were. 
Most studies have neither recognized nor addressed the persistence of apparent quiescence. 
For example, Lodge [9] and Brewer [l01 each see the period 1978-84 as one of generalized 
rebellion: either as a continuation, albeit at a less intense level, of the 1976-77 confrontations 
(Lodge), or as a run-up to those of 1984-87 (Brewer). Murray [l l], who focusses on popular 
rebellion during 1984-86, does not discuss the persistence of non-confrontation well into 
1985 in such major townships as Soweto. 
There seem to be three reasons for this neglect of what seems to be popular quiescence. 
Firstly, when viewed "from above", protest in the period 1978-84 seemed both general and 
chronic. But protest was rarely disaggregated. Studies focussed on nationalist organization, 
guerrilla activity, industrial action, and (in a few important cases, mostly outside of the 
PWV) mass protests - which contrasted with the pre-1976 period - but assumed a parallel 
resurgence of popular protest, which they failed to explore. [l21 Secondly, most of these 
authors worked within a broadly Marxist analytical framework which viewed resistance and 
state "reforms" as products of a fundamental or "organic" crisis. Resistance arose, fairly 
unproblematically, out of the crisis (and in turn exacerbated it); resistance was therefore 
expected to continue as long as the crisis remained unresolved. [l31 Whilst slower economic 
growth and some increase in popular protest were contemporary, the link was considerably 
less clear and uniform than was often implicitly argued. Thirdly, authors' celebration of 
political protest led to an exaggerated impression of its extent. [l41 
The discussion of popular protest in these studies is problematic: empirically, because they 
ignore the pervasive extent of apparent quiescence; and analytically, because they do not 
provide a unitary interpretation of both the occurrence and absence of popular protest. When 
"quiescence" cannot be ignored, as for the 1960s, it is almost routinely attributed to overt 
repression: leaders and organizations were suppressed, and informers "promoted a climate of 
fear and distrust, effectively paralysing any political initiative" [15], so that "for the average 
African it became wise to regard politics as a taboo subject even in casual conversation". [l61 
Overt repression alone is an insufficient explanation, not least because it provides no basis 
for understanding how the transition to protest or rebellion occurs, i.e. how and why 
repression ceases to be an operative constaint. 
These studies see "quiescence" as residual, rebellion as the "normal" or readily explicable 
state of affairs. Recent processual accounts of township politics have, however, emphasized 
the need to encompass the analysis of protest and non-protest within a unitary framework. 
They have not, however, explicitly discussed such a framework, although several of these 
studies have provided very useful evidence and pointers. John Gaventa has approached 
quiescence from a very different perspective, seeing it as the more chronic phenomenon with 
rebellion being the less explicable residual. Gaventa's theory is helpful in moving towards a 
unitary interpretation of popular political action. 
Gaventa's Theory of Quiescence 
Gaventa's theory of quiescence is based on his study of a non-South African context, a valley 
in the American Appalachian mountains. [l71 Gaventa analyses quiescence in terms of the 
nature of powerlessness, and thus in terms of the power relations that the powerless are 
caught in. These power relations shape the possible benefits and costs accruing to alternative 
forms of political action. Quiescence was a rational choice for the people in Gaventa's case- 
study, given their appraisal of (a) the poor prospects for successful rebellion combined with 
(b) the high costs of failure because of their vulnerability to retaliation. 
The valley's residents had acute economic and political grievances against the local political 
elites, who were based in electoral and trade union institutions. Yet they did not challenge 
either elite by raising their grievences. Instead, they voted for conservative candidates in 
local elections, and actively opposed a reformist movement in their trade union (despite the 
similarity between their own grievances and the reformers' demands). Thus "the conflict 
which emerges into the local political arena is rarely substantive compared with what could 
emerge" and the general result was "a routine of non-conflict within and around local 
politics". 
The powerless were quiescent, Gaventa argues, precisely because of their powerlessness. 
The elite controlled access to a wide range of material resources. The powerless were 
vulnerable to further immiserization, and so dependent on the political elite's continued 
benevolence. That benevolence would disappear if the power relation itself was challenged. 
Therefore, "while the benefits of the status quo are high for the powerful, the costs of 
challenge are potentially higher for the powerless". The powerless in Gaventa's valley were 
involved in power relations which they could not avoid, but the perceived prospects for 
successfully challenging those relations were poor whilst the costs of an unsuccessful 
challenge were high. Reactionary loyalties or just political inaction comprised rational 
behaviour. 
It "is not the actual exercise of coercion but the constant possibility that it might be exercised 
that supports the routines of non-challenge". Furthermore, it is not the exercise of physical 
coercion as much as the refusal of access to material resources that constitutes the operative 
threat. Other research into working-class quiescence has pointed to the same general theme: 
protest risks exclusion from the political system and thus the denial of any benefits, whilst 
"participation" in even an inegalitarian and unresponsive system offers very limited, but at 
least some, benefit. [l 81 
Gaventa further argued that "power is accumulative by nature". The power of the political 
elite (most clearly in the union) enabled it to manipulate information and so accentuate the 
powerlessness of the powerless. 
"Quie~cence~~ and Struggle in South African Townships 
Powerlessness characterizes the position of the residents of South African townships, as it 
does in the case of Gaventa's Appalachian Valley. Indeed, in some ways, the powerlessness 
of the former is even greater. They are politically disenfranchised at a national level, are the 
products of a discriminatory educational system, and are subject to the greater coercive 
power of the South African state. 
The workings of the power relations that township residents are involved in are, in outline, 
similar to those in Gaventa's valley. Residents are vulnerable not only to the state's use of 
overt repression through brute force but also to the state's control (at least potentially) over 
access to a wide range of very important material resources: urban residential rights, 
housing, pensions, and (directly or indirectly) employment and income. Repression 
permeates the operation of the whole political system, and the powers of the police to break 
up a meeting, to detain individuals, and to secure convictions in trials, may all be less 
important than the powers of administrators to threaten potential protesters with the loss of 
their jobs or impairment of their income, or the loss of houses or passes. [l91 
Township residents are vulnerable to retaliation, and their choices of political action need to 
be understood in terms of their reluctance to risk worsening their position as well as their 
concern to improve it. Whilst their position was bad, residents certainly had more to lose 
than just their proverbial chains. Adam and Moodley make a similar point: 
To earn a living, to make ends meet, to avoid risks, to survive in 
a hostile environment absorb so much energy and impose such 
stringent rules of conduct that alternatives are hard to contemplate. 
The routine of the daily drudgery guarantees compliance almost 
by itself, independent of supportive ideologies. [20] 
Power relations in the townships, as in Gaventa's valley, inculcated inaction as a political 
response among many people. [21] The concern to protect access to even low levels of 
material resources was a powerful impetus. A small proportion of township residents were 
pulled into reactionary, state-supportive action. These included, especially in 1985-87, 
township-based vigilante groups. [22] Most township residents avoided confrontation, and 
often opted for limited benefits, when these were available, rather than lobby for more but 
thereby risk all. 
Power relations in South African townships were, however, rather more complex than in 
Gaventa's case-study. Power relations in the latter were particularly monolithic: both 
electoral and union politics were strictly hierarchical (or pyramidical), with power 
concentrated "at the top". There was, for example, little opportunity for the powerless to 
play off candidates in elections against each other. The powerless were bound into 
unconditional subservience, whose loyality to the elite was necessarily absolute. 
Power relations in South African townships were less monolithic, at least in practice. This 
allowed residents to choose between more options than just rebellion or unconditional 
subservience. In the townships there have been two poorly linked sets of power relations, 
and the articulation between these has allowed space for non-conflictual forms of protest. 
These two sets of power relations comprise those (1) between township and the state and (2) 
within the township. The state has not, historically, managed to establish general and 
effective township administration. [23] One way in which the state sought to overcome this 
problem was through fostering, first, elements of indirect rule in township administration, 
and more recently by extending this to elements of representation in local government. [24] 
Both of these have involved the participation of (black) township residents, in particular as 
the members of township boards or councils. Such local government reforms did extend the 
scope of township administration, but without fully subordinating that administration to the 
state. Furthermore, as reforms transferred responsibilities (although not so much power) to 
councillors, so the state itself became partially dependent on councillors themselves for 
township administration. Relations between state and councillors were therefore never 
strictly hierarchical, and the partial autonomy of townships from the state cantinued, 
1 although now in a form institutionalized "within" the state. 
As a result of the partial autonomy of the township from the state, the workings of power 
I relationships at the township level involved a degree of struggle absent in Gaventa's case 
1 study. In the latter, discontented people did not raise their demands in any way because there 
l 
was no way for them to do so without being disloyal and so running a significant risk of 
retribution. In South Aii-ican townships, however, there are a range of ways in which 
l 
I 
grievances can be acted on, explicitly or implicitly, without that risk. Struggles concerned 
both the relationship between the state and the township and within the township, especially 
I between councillors and residents. Whilst townships might have seemed "quiescent" when 
I viewed from above, political conflict becomes visible when examined from below. 
Townships appeared to be quiescent because of residents' concern to protest only through 
non-confrontational channels, i.e. in ways that did not precipitate confrontation with the 
central state. 
Struggle took three main forms. Firstly, township residents sought to redress their grievances 
without involving the state, i.e. by solving problems within the township without recourse to 
l 
the state. Secondly, residents might engage in "hidden forms" of resistance, up to the limits 
of the state's ability to retaliate. Thirdly, township residents utilized channels for political 
action that were acceptable to the state, involving lobbying or negotiation. Each of these will 
be considered in turn. 
l 
1 (1) Evasion of the State 
Evasion of the state involved undertaking a range of activities outside of the state's 
structures. This meant denying, either explicitly or implicitly, that the state had sole 
jurisdiction or responsibility to undertake these activities. The terms of the relationship 
between state and township were being contested. 
Such evasion of the state courted the state's hostility. Evasion of the state therefore required 
I the state's acceptance or ignorance of such action, or at least its unwillingness to try to 
1 suppress it. In practice, the state was also concerned with the efficacy of administration and 
I conflict-limitation, and seems to have condoned a range of evasions, if they were presided 
over by township conservatives, especially township councillors. Councillors might either 
not inform the state of what was going on or, alternatively, were to some extent immune from 
suppression. When evasion of the state was presided over by township "radicals", as in the 
case of "people's power" in 1985-87, then the state was rapidly repressive. 
Township courts and extra-state policing provide a good illustration of the evasion of the 
state. 1251 There have been extra-state dispute settlement and policing in townships for a 1 long time. Wilsworth, in her study of Grahamstown townships conducted in 1974-76, 
l described at length mechanisms within the township for conflict resolution. Wilsworth distinguishes several levels of dispute settlement within the townships, culminating in extra- 
state township courts. "If at all possible", she wrote, "the police as well as various other 
official channels are kept out of conflict.' [26) 
Township courts were generally run by people with some official position, but who retained 
some autonomy from the state. In Grahamstown, courts were run by the Chief or his 
intermediaries (amaphakathi). Township residents regarded the members of the Urban Bantu 
Council in Grahamstown as, in effect, part of the state, i.e. they lacked autonomy. According 
to one: "I wouldn't like to go to the UBC because that always works up to the constables, it 
always goes out." [27] In PWV townships, by contrast, the authority of chiefs was not 
widely respected, and township courts tended to be run by councillors or members of their 
ward committees. Hund and Kotu-Ramrnopo describe the existence in Mamelodi in the early 
1980s of several different, and competing, township courts or makgotla. [28] 
Courts were primarily concerned with civil and family disputes, especially concerning 
disrespectful or delinquent youths. These concerns involved the maintenance of 
"community", and in particular of a specific, social order that the court thought (rightly or 
wrongly) bound the "community" together. Most court cases seem to have involved 
residents' failures to fulfil historical "obligations" (or expectations), to their neighbours, their 
parents, or their wives or husbands. Serious criminal cases were generally taken to the 
police. 
Not all courts were popular. Some makgotla operated primarily on the basis of severe 
coercion: some people at least did not participate in court through choice. Many, however, 
involved a significant degree of direct popular support and participation. [29] These courts 
enjoyed popular support because the social order that they sought to construct or maintain 
was a popular order, and because the procedure of courts was regarded as acceptable. Order 
was functional to daily life, and "community" regulation by township courts enabled pressing 
problems to be solved easily and without recourse to the state, which had its own social 
agenda. 
Until 1985, township courts were tacitly approved of by the state (to varying extents by 
different parts of the state). Local government legislation even provided for township courts. 
[30] State tolerance (or ignorance) extended to some of the more popular makgotla run by 
conservative opposition councillors, who attracted popular support when they promoted 
popular causes. Township "radicals" were, it seems, rarely active in regular dispute 
settlement. [3 l] 
Another form of evasion of the state was the non-implementation of state policy by 
individuals or institutions in official positions. In Soweto, in the mid-1970s, T W Kambule, 
principal at Orlando High School, "solved" the issue of Afrikaans medium teaching by 
simply ignoring departmental regulations and not applying for exemption. Kambule was put 
under considerable pressure by officials of the Department of Bantu Education, but he called 
their bluff and got away with it. [32] 
The state's extensive control of resources often served as a disincentive to evasion. Protests 
which involved losing out on state-controlled resources were difficult to sustain. For 
example, school boycotts have frequently run into problems from students (or their parents) 
who feel that some education (or qualification) is better than none. This was the case in the 
1980 school boycotts in the Western Cape, and was a source of division among students in 
some townships, at least during 1985-87. [33] 
The state's control over resources allowed it to ensure a higher degree of subordination in 
conflicts over key grievances in the early 1980s, making them less amenable to "resolution" 
through evasion. The legal constraints on township councils imposed on them the need to 
increase rents if there was to be any urban development. When councils refused to sanction 
the appropriate rent increases, the state responded in one of three ways. The first was to 
overrule the councils. For example, in 1981 the Daveyton Community Council was 
prevented from halving rents, whilst in 1982 the chairmen of the Ikageng and Orkney 
community councils in the western Transvaal were dismissed for refusing to approve a 
doubling of the rents. [34] The second option by the state was more common: no rent 
increase, no development. For example, the Duduza Community Council was cut off from 
state development funds after it rejected a rent increase in 1982-83. [35] The Mamelodi and 
Atteridgeville Councils opposed rent increases in 1981, but were pressurized into agreeing to 
major rent increases in 1982. Both of these fust two options led to increased popular 
discontent with councils as institutions, as they emphasized their powerlessness (in this 
respect). The third option to ,the state was to subsidize development. This was against state 
policy, and it seems that it was only in the atypical case of Soweto that this occurred. [36] 
(2) Hidden Resistance 
Secondly, residents might engage in "hidden forms" of resistance, such as petty sabotage, 
arson, non-cooperation at a routine administrative level, and so on. This is clearly an overlap 
between hidden forms and evasion of the state, as in the case of squatting, for example. 
Unfortunately, there are, to my knowledge, no studies that look at hidden forms of resistance 
in the contemporary township context. [37] 
One form of everyday resistance was popular evasion of the state's housing policies through 
backyard squatting. Whilst the state was, during this period, intolerant of open sqatting 
outside of proclaimed townships, it was faced with more difficult political decisions by the 
proliferation of backyard shacks. In Katelehong, there were twice as many backyard shacks 
as houses in 1983. In practice, the state's repeated attempts to eliminate backyard shacks 
achieved, at best, short-lived results. 
13) "Acce~table" Protest 
Thirdly, township residents utilized channels for political action that they thought were 
acceptable to the state, and were hence not confrontational. There is an overlap here with 
many forms of evasion of the state, which continue because the state tolerates evasion when 
it is done by conservatives (or when suppression is not deemed worthwhile, as in Kambule's 
case above). 
This "protest" took the form of lobbying and negotiation. From 1971, "school boards and 
committees in urban areas became the focii of protest against aspects of state educational 
policy". From 1974 school boards strongly and combatively opposed the imposition of 
Afrikaans medium teaching. Teachers' associations also protested strongly. 1381 
More generally, township councillors were intermediaries between township residents and 
state. From the mid-1970s, township councils incurred rising unpopularity, particularly for 
increasing rents and evicting rent defaulters and squatters, whilst not providing sufficient 
new housing, development or services. On most councils, however, there were individual 
councillors who opposed council policy over these issues, adopting a radical or populist line. 
Some of these councillors had good links with the nationalist movement, and many were 
popular in the townships. Council membership often offered possibilities for material gain, 
but it is clear that many of these dissident councillors believed that their membership of 
councils could provide benefits to their constituents. The best example of this is probably 
Harrison Dube in Lamontville, who was assassinated in April 1983. Examples in the PWV 
included Shadrack Sinaba in Daveyton, H Pitje in Mamelodi, and Kebana Moloi in 
Duduza. [39] 
Other councillors besides the dissident populists were at least sometimes responsive to their 
constituents. Many councillors were elected on the basis of patronage structures. Residents 
provided votes (and possibly fees), whilst councillors performed the roles of arbiters of 
justice and dispensers of certain forms of patronage. Councillors would both participate in 
the evasion of the state, through, for example, township courts, and in lobbying the state over 
routine issues (such as the procurement of permits, the contesting of specific eviction orders, 
and the maintenance of council-owned housing). They would also be expected to lobby over 
policy issues. Some whole councils lobbied over and voiced criticisms of state policy. East 
Rand councils were especially prominent in demands for external funding for township 
development. [40] 
There were tight limits to the influence that councils could have on the state. On minor 
issues, including sometimes local state staffmg, councils could achieve successes. Some 
councillors themselves claimed they played a key role in significant state policy shifts [41], 
but it is likely that the councils' influence was merely a reflection of much broader pressures 
on the state, such as the passive resistance of squatting or the active resistance of overt 
rebellion. 
By the mid- 1980s it was becoming increasingly clear to township residents and many 
dissident councillors that the councils had little direct influence over the most pressing 
grievances of residents. At the same time, the nature of councillor-constituent relations was 
changing. Patronage became an increasingly commercial and less of a moral relationship. 
Many councillors were not only seen to be feathering their own nests very amply but also 
demanded rising bribes from their "clients". 
When school boards (in the mid-1970s) and township councillors (in the early 1980s) 
became either unable or unwilling to respond adequately to popular grievances, dissident 
councillors and residents responded by trying to lobby the council or the central state through 
acceptable but extra-council channels. This led to a proliferation of minor public 
demonstrations or other protests, and provided the impetus for the establishment of many 
civic organizations. Harrison Dube, for example, played a key role in the establishment of 
the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) in Durban townships when he and residents grew 
disillusioned with the Community Council. [42] In the PWV, rent increases between 1980 
and 1984 led to the formation of a number of usually issue-specific and often short-lived 
bodies. For example, in Daveyton the announcement of a rent increase in May 1984 led to 
the formation of a Daveyton Action Committee which, together with the dissident councillor 
Sinaba and supported by the UDF-affiliated East Rand People's Organisation (ERAPO), 
lobbied the Department of Cooperation and Development for a cancellation of the increase. 
L431 
The concerns of these civic protests and organizations were, initially, to re-establish channels 
for the redress of popular grievances that were acceptable to the state. In some cases, these 
would pull councillors into line. In Daveyton, for example, public demonstrations over the 
demolition of backyard shacks, together with lobbying by the dissident councillor Sinaba, 
persuaded the council to call a halt to backyard shack demolitions. In Duduza, the newly 
formed Civil Association persauded the Council to reject a rent increase in late1982/83. In 
the local authority elections in late 1983, several councils were taken over by populist civic 
organizations that had been critical of council policy in the past. In Mamelodi, the populist 
Vukani Vulahmelo People's Party (VVPP) won office on a 28 per cent poll. 
Popular support for civil organizations depended on their success in taking up popular 
grievances. Civil organizations, like the VVPP, which took control of councils were unable 
to maintain popularity as they, like their predecessors, found they had responsibility (for 
implementing unpopular policies) without power (to challenge the effective constraints on 
key popular grievances). Civil organizations which operated outside of the councils could 
retain popular support as public watch-dog bodies, supervising - and criticizing - the councils 
without taking responsibility for their policies. But the nature of watch-dog activity involved 
operating sporadically, whilst the nature of popular grievances precluded major successes 
(rent increases could be successfully opposed, but state-subsidized development could not be 
secured by civil organizations). During periods of inactivity, civil organizations' popularity 
fell. [44] 
The activities of civil organizations were generally not confrontational, but were rather 
geared to embarrassing the council or lobbying the state. Few civic organizations were 
primarily concerned with national or nationalist activities. The Duduza Civil Association, for 
example, saw its role as to "act as a bridge between the residents and the Community 
Council". It was established as an explicit alternative to the Council in the sense that it 
resulted from the perception that the Council had been failing in its responsibilities to 
residents, but it sought to work in conjunction with and not to supplant the Council. [45] 
The principle of lobbying of and negotiations with the state was widely accepted. [46] The 
mechanisms for doing so changed, with the decline in perceived efficacy of the councils and 
the formation of alternative civil organizations, but the broad strategy remained unchanged. 
Confrontation was to be avoided. 
The basis for this strategy of lobbying the state through acceptable structures was the two 
inter-related sets of power relations, i.e. the relations between state and township and 
relations within the township. Struggles over the representation of residents (by councils, 
dissident councillors, or extra-council civic organizations) articulated with struggles over the 
administration of townships. Neither state nor residents could determine both sets of power 
relations. The state could, if it really wanted to, enforce particular policies over the heads of 
protesters - such as with the issues of Afrikaans (in 1974-76) and rent increases (especially in 
the early 1980s). But there was an indirect cost to the state, as the credibility of school 
boards or councils was thereby damaged. Major policy shifts were less the result of direct 
discussions than of indirect pressure, from township conflict or fiscal concerns. 
Rebellion as an Unintended Outcome 
Apparent quiescence in townships in the PWV since c1973 masked the existence of 
particular forms of non-confrontational political action, including by and through civic 
organizations. This pattern of political action reflected township residents' appraisal of the 
possible benefits and costs accruing to this and alternative patterns of action, and this 
appraisal was fundamentally structured by their general powerlessness. 
On two major occasions, 1976-77 and 1984-87, this pattern of political action changed 
dramatically. Studies generally imply that existing patterns of political action were suddenly 
and abruptly replaced by new forms. This seems implausible, and recent accounts point to an 
alternative emphasis: the transition was gradual, with confrontation often an unintended 
outcome. [47] 
The transition from "quiescence" to ''rebellion" resulted from the nature of "quiescence", i.e. 
of the existing pattern of non-conflictual political action for the redress of grievances. It 
arose out of the inability of those forms of action adequately to address new grievances. 
"Rebellion" constituted, initially, an attempt to rectify the previous mechanisms for 
redressing grievances, i.e. to preserve the efficacy of non-confrontational protest. It was 
defensive rather than revolutionary in intent. 
Acceptable protest required mediation (such as through school boards or councils). The 
relationship between mediators and residents had the inherent potential to be unstable, as the 
former sought popular endorsement at the same time as being answerable to the state. It was 
the intensification of struggle over the relationship of mediators with the powerless that 
finally led to the end of apparent quiescence. 
The studies of 1976 provide only pointers towards an exploration within this framework. 
The proliferation of student protests in the first half of 1976, culminating in the mass public 
demonstration of 16 June, and the emergence of parents' organization, followed the failure of 
school-level structures (school committees or boards, teachers or principals) to redress the 
grievances of Afrikaans-medium teaching. As Hyslop writes: "The story of the period 
leading up to June 1976 is in part one of the refusal of the Bantu Education Department to 
listen to its own school boards". [48] In their meetings with departmental officials, school 
boards had run up against complete intransigence over this issue. The students' 
demonstration was provocative, but also constituted the most restrained but possibly effective 
option that student leaders could have chosen. 
Similarly, in 1984 protest action over rent increases generally took the least conhntational 
form possible. In Daveyton, the role of the populist councillor Sinaba was one factor which 
enabled township activists (including ERAPO) to protest against the rent increase without 
immediately confrontational consequences. Public meetings were held in the stadium 
(organized by Sinaba) and a delegation was elected to take a petition over the heads of the 
council. 
Mass public demonstrations and stay-aways, as in Tumahole in July 1984 and the Vaal 
Triangle on 3 September, occurred when the existing repertoire of political action was 
exhausted. The intention of most participants was not, however, to confront. In the Vaal, 
two factors combined to precipitate mass public demonstration. Firstly, the council was 
completely discredited. Even the official inquiry into the Vaal Uprising reported that "No 
resident I spoke to had a good word for the Lekoa Municipality". [49] There were no 
popular dissident councillors (with the exception of Zamdela). Secondly, extra-council civic 
activists had no experience of negotiation over popular grievances, and do not seem to have 
considered appeals to the government over the heads of the local administration. The 
participants in the 3 September demonstrations, therefore, included former members of 
council-linked parties who had left them over their acquiescence in unpopular council 
policies or activities. [50] 
Township politics underwent rapid change once the state suppressed protests, and 
confrontation proliferated. Confrontation itself reshaped patterns of protest dramatically. As 
Shanin puts it: 
For its participants a revolution is a moment of truth. It is so 
not only metaphorically, in the sense of supreme confrontation 
with political enemies, but also most directly, in the sense of 
looking at one's own assumptions, images and beliefs in the 
merciless light of experience. [5 l] 
New grievancves crystallized, and were acted upon. New interests and new sets of 
participants emerged. The importance of the role of intermediaries continued, however, as 
attacks on councillors and policemen in many townships indicated. 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the occurrence of apparent quiescence and rebellion cannot simply 
be read off the existence of grievances, organizations or ideologies. An important factor is 
the character of existing forms of political action. Fuerthermore, the boundaries between 
apparent quiescence and rebellion can be very unclear, as the transition from one to the other 
is gradual and the intentions of the participants can remain very limited. 
Apparent quiescence was pervasive in the period 1973-1985, with township residents 
engaging in a range of non-confrontational forms of political action. Power relations worked 
in such a way as both to underlie, or intensify, popular grievances and at the same time to 
inhibit popular political responses by imposing the probability of high material costs arising 
from rebellion. During 1976 and 1984-85 the existing channels for non-confrontational 
political action broke down, and, in attempts to re-establish these or other non- 
confrontational channels, people engaged in protests which led to the generally unintended 
outcome of confrontation with the state. 
Township politics should not be viewed in terms of sharply contrasting periods of 
"quiescence" and "rebellion", but rather in terms of more gradual transitions with shifting 
patterns of political action. Both the radicalism of many participants in non-confrontational, 
even state-related, forms of political action and the conservatism of many participants in 
"rebellious" protests need to be recognized. 
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